Abstract. This papers introduces several binary scalar multiplication algorithms with applications to cryptography. Remarkably, the proposed algorithms regularly repeat the same pattern when evaluating a scalar multiplication in an (additively written) abelian group. Furthermore, they are generic and feature the following properties:
Introduction
Fast exponentiation techniques (e.g., [19] ) are central in the implementation of public-key cryptography. RSA cryptosystem uses exponentiation in Z Input: P ∈ G and k = (kt−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N Output: Q = kP 1: R0 ← O 2: for j = t − 1 downto 0 do 3:
if (k j = 1) then R 0 ← R 0 + P 5: end for 6: return R0
In addition to efficiency, another concern when implementing cryptosystems is of course security. The methods we propose resist certain side-channel attacks and fault attacks.
Simple power analysis (SPA) exploits distinct patterns from a single power trace [28] . If scalar k represents a secret value, it can be so recovered because, as presented, the double-and-add algorithm behaves irregularly. Making it regular is however not difficult by replacing the if-then statement with an indirect addressing and by adding a dummy group addition when bit k j is equal to 0 [11] . More explicitly, the line ' if (k j = 0) then R 0 ← R 0 + P ' can be replaced with
Although protecting against SPA-type attacks, the so-obtained algorithm is now vulnerable to safe-error attacks [48] . By timely inducing a fault during the evaluation of ' R 1−k j ← R 1−k j +P ', an attacker may deduce whether bit k j = 0 by checking if the returned result, Q = kP , is correct -for example, if Q is a digital signature (or a part thereof), the attacker may check its validity using the corresponding public verification key. Indeed, when bit k j = 0, the faulty evaluation R 1 + P is written back in R 1 and as R 1 is not needed, the output of the algorithm won't be affected.
The so-called Montgomery ladder [36] protects against SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks, at the same time [26] : it is highly regular and does not involve dummy operation. The algorithm is given below.
Rk j ← 2Rk j 5: end for 6: return R 0
In this paper, we present algorithms that enjoy the security features of Montgomery ladder (i.e., resistance against SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks 1 ) but with various performance Moreover, they can be combined with previous techniques (e.g., [5, Chapter V] or [10, Chapter 29] ) to offer resistance against DPA-type attacks [28, 23] . Finally, they process the multiplier bits from the right to the left, which offers a better resistance against certain attacks (e.g., [16, 47] ).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our new algorithms. In Section 3, we give illustrations to the secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms in constrained devices. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
New Algorithms
Throughout this section, we let G denote an additively written abelian group with identity element O. We also let ord G (P ) denote the order of P as an element in G.
On input an element P ∈ G and a t-bit integer k, the goal is to compute Q = kP ∈ G. We present below several new right-to-left binary methods for evaluating kP .
Double-add algorithm
j with k j ∈ {0, 1} be the binary expansion of k. We have:
Now, for j 0, we define
Hence we get
and
Equivalently, we have shown:
Noting that Q = kP = S t−1 , this yields the following right-to-left scalar multiplication algorithm. At the end of iteration j, temporary registers R 0 and R 1 respectively contain the values of S j and of T j .
Algorithm 1 Double-add scalar multiplication algorithm.
Remark 1. In certain groups G, adding identity element O needs a special treatment, which, in turn, may reveal the number of least significant zero-bits of k. This can be circumvented by adding to k an appropriate multiple of ord G (P ) to ensure that the parity of the resulting scalar is always the same. This can also be circumvented by computing kP with the least significant bit of k forced to 1, k ← (k − k 0 ) + 1, and then by subtracting P to the so-obtained element if bit k 0 is zero. This second approach is useful for scalars k ord G P . A similar trick is used in Algorithm 2 (see next section).
Algorithm 1 Double-add scalar multiplication algorithm (for small scalars).
Add-only algorithm
Algorithm 1 can be modified into an algorithm only involving additions in G, that is, without involving doublings. This may be advantageous as only the general addition operation in G has to be implemented, resulting in some code/memory savings.
An extra temporary register, R 2 , is used to store the value of B j+1 = S j +T j . Remember that temporary registers R 0 and R 1 are used to respectively store the values of S j and of T j .
Algorithm 2 Add-only scalar multiplication algorithm.
We assume that k is odd (i.e., R 0 is initialized to P and loop counter starts at j = 1) in the computation of Q = kP and subtract P at the end of the computation if it is not the case (cf. Line 6). Let g = ord G (P ). We also assume that scalar k is smaller than g. Finally, we let k −1 denote the most significant bit of k different from 0, i.e., k −1 = 1 and k j = 0 for j t − 1. Because k < g is assumed to be odd, temporary register R 0 always contains an odd multiple of P ; 2 the same is true for temporary register R 1 for j < − 1 since T j = 2 j+1 P −S j . Similarly, temporary register R 2 always contains a power of 2 multiple of P for j < − 1. Consequently, it follows that, for 1 j − 2,
, and
j+1 P can only be the sum of two equal odd multiples of P when R 0 , R 1 ← P , which never occurs when j 1, and when j = − 1, -temporary register R 0 gets the value of kP (and is no longer modified for j t − 1).
We further note that the evaluation of 2P (cf. Line 1) does not necessarily require a doubling operation as its value can be evaluated as 2P = (P + A) + (P − A) for an arbitrary element A ∈ G \ {O} and ord G (A) = 2.
Remark 2. Certain randomization techniques for preventing differential sidechannel analysis lead to a scalar larger than ord G (P ). For example, in [11] , Coron suggests to evaluate Q = kP as Q = k * P where k * = k + r ord G (P ) for a (small) random integer r. Letting g = ord G (P ), b = log 2 (g) , and β = 2 b , we write k
The computation of k * P can then be carried out with Algorithm 2 as
by observing that the value of β (i+1) P is available in temporary register R 2 at the end of the computation of k * i (β i P ).
Add-always algorithms
There is another possible modification. By construction, we have B j+1 = S j + T j = 2B j . The updating step of R 2 in Algorithm 2 (Line 4) can thus be replaced with R 2 ← 2R 2 . Doing so, however, the operation
becomes dummy when b = 1 -and so the resulting algorithm may be subject to safe-error attacks. The right way is to first perform a doubling and next an addition. This yields a right-to-left binary algorithm only using two temporary registers (and not three) and where all group operations are effective, as depicted in Algorithm 3. The correctness of the so-obtained algorithm easily follows from Algorithm 1. Note also that it can be adapted when O behaves differently (see Remark 1).
Algorithm 3 Add-always scalar multiplication algorithm (General case).
Input: P ∈ G and k = (kt−1, . . . , k0)2 ∈ N Output: Q = kP 1:
Rb ← Rb + Rk j 5: end for 6: return R0 Rewriting Line 4 of Algorithm 2 as R 2 ← 2R 2 can nevertheless be useful to get an algorithm for the evaluation of Lucas recurrences -namely, elements x n ∈ L satisfying
by observing that the relation R 2 − R b = R kj is always satisfied throughout the algorithm: hence both R b and R k j are needed for the "add" operation. See Section 3.2 for an illustration.
Algorithm 4 Add-always algorithm for Lucas recurrences.
Input:
R 2 ← Ldouble(R 2 ) 5: end for 6: return R 0
Applications
In this section, we present several applications of our algorithms to the secure implementation of elliptic curve cryptography. The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems relies on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem in the group G of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field. Elliptic curve based applications require the computation of Q = kP in G where k ∈ [1, ord G (P )[ represents an ephemeral or a long-term secret (see, e.g., [4, 10, 22] assuming non-supersingular binary curves. The set of points (x, y) satisfying the above equations together with the 'point at infinity' O form an abelian group G under the chord-and-tangent rule, where O is the neutral element. We summarize in the next table the cost of certain point operations.
As aforementioned, attention should be paid when implementing scalar multiplication algorithms for cryptographic purposes for the evaluation of kP as they may be prone to implementation attacks. The algorithms of the previous section were devised as a protection against SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks. We recall that they can be used in conjunction with other techniques to offer resistance against other classes of attacks. See, e.g., [5, Chapter V] or [10, Chapter 29] for a collection of useful techniques.
Optimal extension fields
The ratio I/M is of crucial interest when comparing the performance of different algorithms. In particular, this ratio depends on the type and representation of the underlying finite field [7, 21] . If the field inversion is too expensive then projective coordinates are preferred [12] . In [43] , Smart gives a comprehensive comparison for different fields representations. He concludes that optimal extension fields (OEFs) offer the best performance, even when used with affine coordinates.
OEFs were introduced by Bailey and Paar [2] for optimized field arithmetic (see also [27] ). An OEF is a field
where p is a pseudoMersenne prime of the form 2 n ± c that fits in a processor word. In an OEF, a typical value for the ratio I/M is 4.
From Table 1 , we see that the evaluation of point Q = kP on an elliptic curve costs 2 inversions (resp. 1 inversion), 2 squarings and 3 multiplications (resp. 9 multiplications) per bit of scalar k, using our double-add algorithm (Algorithm 1). This represents an improvement of
compared to the classical SPA-resistant binary algorithms ( [11] ), where δ = 1 over F p and δ = 0 over F 2 m . For example, if we estimate S/M = 1 and I/M = 4, we get a 13.3% improvement for elliptic curves over an OEF.
Right-to-left López-Dahab ladder
Carrying out the evaluation of Q = kP with the x-coordinate only is a promising venue to speed up the computations: since the y-coordinate does not need to be evaluated, one may expect to save some modular multiplications. This technique was successfully applied to the elliptic curve method of factoring by Montgomery on special-form elliptic curves [36] . We remark that not all elliptic curves admit a Montgomery form [38] ; addition formulas for general elliptic curves over (large) prime fields are given in [6, 25] (see also [45, Chapter 5]).
López and Dahab adapted Montgomery's method to non-supersingular elliptic curves over binary fields [32] . They obtained a beautiful algorithm for evaluating the x-coordinate of kP in projective coordinates, and allowing the recovery of the y-coordinate. Table 1 . Number of inversions (I), squarings (S) and multiplications (M ) to add, double and double-add points on elliptic curves.
If we let x n denote the x-coordinate of nP on an elliptic curve over F 2 m , it can be shown that {x n } satisfies a Lucas recurrence [1, 32] . Consequently, Algorithm 4 can be used to evaluate the x-coordinate of kP , namely v := x k . We use projective coordinates, the x-coordinate of nP , x n = X n /Z n , is represented by the pair (X n , Z n ). For improved efficiency, we use the following curve equation
introduced by Stam [44] . The Ladd and Ldouble routines are then given by
If the cross-product ( 
Further applications
Algorithm 2 only requires the general addition formula for adding points: no doublings are involved. Hence, there is no need to implement a routine for doubling points. This results in code savings (or area savings for hardware implementations).
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This may also give rise to better performance. For example, in [9, Exerc. 4 in § 10.6], Cohen reports formulas for adding points with 9 multiplications and for doubling a point with 10 multiplications on an elliptic curve given by a Fermat parameterization in projective coordinates. In this case, the faster addition formula leads to a 5% speed-up improvement.
Another application of our algorithms resides in pairing-based cryptography (e.g., [5, Chapter X] or [10, Chapter 24] ). For example, in contrast to the version of Miller's algorithm as described in [3] for computing pairings, Algorithm 1 leads to the evaluation of a parabola at a point rather than the evaluation of lines and of their product at a point. As detailed in [14] , this needs less effort. Moreover, this results in an algorithm protected against certain implementation attacks [40] .
Conclusion
This paper presented highly regular right-to-left binary scalar multiplication algorithms (or exponentiation algorithms for multiplicatively written groups). The proposed algorithms are very simple to implement (both in hardware and in software) and require little memory. Moreover, they are protected against SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks, and can be combined with previous techniques to offer resistance against other attacks. Consequently, we believe that our algorithms are useful for cryptographic applications in constrained devices as they offer a number of advantages compared to the classical binary algorithms.
